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Thinking Outside the Box: The South China Sea Issue and the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(Options, Limitations and Prospects)
A dispute over ownership is
generallY a legal issue. But the
present case is replete with highlY
complicatedextralegal factors that
will tend to limit the role of
international law as a means of
settlement greatlY. The prospect of
a legalsolution is not encouraging.
The South China Sea issue is a geopolitical tinder box waiting to
explode.2 It is clear that the primary reason for the claims is based on its
strategic location and its hydrocarbon potential,3 However, this is more
than a simple conflict over resources.4 The issue goes beyond the question
• PhD Candidate, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, Faculty of Law,
University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia (2006 to present); LL.M., Dalhousie University (Halifax,
Nova Scotia, Canada) (2005); Diploma, Rhodes Academy of Ocean Law and Policy (Rhodes, Greece)
(2003); LL.B, University of the Philippines (2002); BA Political Science, ctlm laNde, University of the
Philippines (1998). 1bis is a revised and updated version of a paper submitted for the author's course on
the Law of the Sea at Dalhousie University under Professor David L. VanderZwaag in 2004:
I CHOON-Ho PARK. EAST AsIA ANDTIlE LAw OF TIlE SEA216 (1983).
2 NING Lu, FLASHPOINTSPRATLysl74 (1995). See afro, JOHN LESLIEBERRY,THE CONTEST FOR
THE SPRATLYISLANDSWITII SPECIALREFERENCE TO THE INCREASING 'TENSION IN THE SOUTII
CHINA SEA BETWEENVIETNAM AND CHINA AND THE RELATIONSHIPOF THE ARCHIPELAGOTO
OTHERREGIONAL'TENSIONS(MA Thesis, Monash University, 1995)
J Stephen W. Ritterbush, Marine ResoNrns and the Potentia/for Conflict in the SONth China Sea, 2 THE
FLETCHERFORUM 64 (1978); MARKJ. VALENCIA,ET AL., SHARINGTIlE RESOURCESOF TIlE SOUTH
CHINA SEA (1997).
4 MICHAEL T. KLARE, RESOURCEWARS: THE NEW LANDSCAPEOF GLOBAL CONFLICT 109
(2001).
of territorial sovereignty and natural resource jurisdiction.s This 1S more
than a legalquestion of ownership.6
The South China Sea territorial dispute is a complex issue in
international law. The islands are claimed by six nations: the People's
Republic of China (pRC), the Republic of China (Taiwan), Vietnam,
Malaysia,Brunei, and the Philippines.?All claims maintain to be based on
principles of international law, and in particular, on the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention).8All the parties to
the dispute, with the exception of Taiwan,9 are parties to the LOS
Convention10 and avow to settle the issuewithin its framework.ll
5 GERARDO MARTIN C. VALERO, SPRAlLYARCHIPELAGO:Is 1HE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNlY
STIll. RELEVANT? (1993); MARIs AGAN, THE SOVEREIGNlY DISPUTE OVER 1HE SPRAlLY ISLANDS
(LLM Thesis, University of Melboume, 1998).
6 See MONIQUE CHEMIu.rER-GENDREAU, SOVEREIGNlY OVER 1HE PARACELAND SPRAlLY
ISLANDS21 - 29 (2000) for discussion of the legal issue. See also, Christopher C. Joyner, The Spratfy
Islandr Dispute: Legal Issms and Prospects for Diplomatic ActOmmodation, in COOPERATIVEMONITORING IN
1HE SOU1H CHINA SEA: SATELUTE IMAGERY, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES,' AND lliE
SPRAlLy'ISLANDSDISPUTES 17 - 34 Oohn C. Baker & David G. Wiencek, eds., 2(02).
7 There are some analysts 'who include Indonesia as a possible seventh claimant country. Indonesia
does not claim any of the islands in the South China Sea. However, the Chinese and Taiwanese claims in
the South China Sea extend into Indonesia's EEZ and continental shelf, including Indonesia's Natuna
gas field. There are some authors, notably Chinese scholars, who do not regard Taiwan as a claimant
country since it is not recognized as a country in intemationallaw but merely as a province of China. See
for example, Jianrning Shen, China's SOlJertign!) OIJtf'the South China Sea Islandr: a Historical Perspective, 1
CHINESEJ. lNT'L L. 94, 96 (2002) which refers to Taiwan as a province of China.
s UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 1HE LAw OF 1HE SU, Montego Bay, 10 December, 1982,
entry into force 14 November 1994, UN Doc. A/Conf.62/122 (1982), 21 LL.M. 1261 [hereinafter LOS
CONVENTION].
• The Ututed Nations and the majority of the international community of states do not recognize
Taiwan as an independent state. Please refer to UN GA Res. 2758 (1971) which resolved the issue of
China's representation in the United Nations. The ASEAN upholds the "One China Policy" and does
not accord independent status to Taiwan. See, Christopher C. Joyner, The Spratfy Islandr Dispute: What Rok
For Normali:;:fng Relations between China and TaillJOn? 32 NEW ENGLAND L. REv. 819-852 (1998). For the
international legal status of Taiwan, see: FRANK P. MORELLO,THE INTERNATIONALLEGAL STATUSOF
FORMOSA (1966); JOHN FRANKLIN COPPER, TAIWAN: NATION-STATE OR PROVINCE? (1990);
HUNGDAH Cmu, THE INTERNATIONALLEGAL STATUSOF 1HE REPUBUC OF CHINA (1992); JEAN-
MARIE HENCKAERTS, ED., THE INTERNATIONALSTATUSOF TAIWAN IN 1HE NEW WORJl) ORDER:
LEGAL AND POUTICAL CONSIDERATIONS (1996); CHEN YI-SHEN, ET AL., Eos., TAIWAN'S
INTERNATIONAL STATUS: HISTORY AND THEORY (2005); WINSTON CHUNG, THE MAKING OF A
NATION: TAIWANSHAPEDBYGEOECONOJl,UCMANDATE(2000).
10 The parties to the dispute apd their respective date of ratification of the LOS Convention:
Brunei Darussalam (5 November 1996); China (7 June 1996); Indonesia (3 February 1986); Malaysia (14
October 1996); Philippines (8 May 1984); and Vietnam (25 July 1994). The chronological lists of
ratifications, accessions and successions to the LOS Convention and its related Agreements (as of 31
May 40(7) online: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_agreements.htm
It PmPHA T TANGSUBKUL,ASEAN AND1HE LAw OF 1HE SEA 3 -20 (1982); Michael Bennet, The




However, while the legal framework under the LOS Convention
offers some options, the highly complicated nature of the dispute tests the
limits of international law and obscures the possibility of a legal solution.
The cultural.aversion of Asians against a judicial settlement, where there are
victors and losers, almost renders this option illusory.12
The dispute over the legal status of the islands of the South China
Sea also stokes intense patriotic fervor among all the claimant countries that
render their positions almost intractable.13 This heightens the possibility of
bloodshed and a military conflict.14 The facile appearance of tranquility
within the region is deceptive. The situation remains volatile.
The South China Sea issue has been a longstanding regional and
global concern. Although the agenda in the negotiating table has hardly
changed, it is still a welcome thought that parties still sit down and talk.
Peace, albeit ephemeral, is always better than war. The pacific settlement of
this issue is the common thread that runs through the positions of all the
claimant countries. IS
The claimant countries,16 and indeed almost all scholars,17 invoke
the LOS Convention in fInding a solution to this imbroglio. Within this
context, the central question is always the issue of sovereignty.18 This is
without doubt a legal question. Since all parties claim to have sound basis in
law for claiming ownership over these islands, inevitably, the debate shifts
to who has the better or best claim.19This always results in an impasse.
12 PARK, supra note 1 at 217.
13 BYRONN. Tzou, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL!..Aw(THE BOUNDARYDISPUTES) 1 (1990).
H MARWYNS. SAMUELS,CONTESTFOR lliE SOlTlH CHINA 98 - 117 (1982); Daojiong Zha and
Mark J. Valencia, Mischief &ef Geopolitics and Implications, 31 J. OF CONTEMP. AsIA 86 (200 1).
IS Zhiguo Gao, The SOllth China Sea: From Conflict to Cooperation? 25 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 345
(1994).
16 See e.g., the official policy of the PRC in resolving the South China Sea issue, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Basic Stance and Poliq of the Chinese Government in Solving the S ollth
China Sea Isslle, available online: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3754/tI9230.htm.
t7 Jonathan I. Charney, Central East Asian Maritime BOllndaries and the UlW of the Sea, 89 AM. J INT'L
L. 724 (1995); Lee G. Cordner, The Sprat!J Islands Displlte and the UlW of the Sea 25 Ocean Dev. & Int'l L.
61(1994). See also David Whitting, The Sprat!J Islands Displlte and the UlW of the Sea 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'y 897 (1997 - 1998).
18 See especial!J, Ian Townsend-Gault, ugal and Political Perspectives on Sovereign!) over the Sprat!J Islands,
online: http://www.sum.uio.no/southchinasea/Publications/pdf-format/Townsend-Gault.pdf> at 9.
19 H. Harry L. Roque, China's Claim to the Sprat!Js Islands IInder International UlW 15 J. ENERGY &
NAT'L REs. L. 189, 199 (1997). See also, Townsend-Gault, id, at 9, 13.
However, the trend in recent scholarship underscores the
imperative of joint development arrangements and co-management
regimes20on the premise that the basis of the claims of all the claimant
countries are inherently weak in international law and vis-a-vis each other.
This paper proceeds from this criticalpoint.
The elaborate backdrop just discussed constitutes the box referred
to in this paper. The challenge that this paper poses is to think outside of
this box.
In order to do this, this paper will aim to: first, explain the complex
nature of the South China Sea issue; second, discuss the bases of the
conflicting claims and proffer a brief evaluation of their relative strengths
and weaknesses as well as their validity under international law; third,
outline and examine the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention and
identify their promises as well as their shortcomings in addressing the South
China Sea issue; and fourth, explore possible solutions toward the pacific
settlement of the issue primarily within the legal framework of the LOS
Convention and outside of it.
The South China Sea,21named after its location, simply pertains to
the sea south of China.22The South China Sea encompasses a portion of
the Pacific Ocean stretching roughly from Singapore and the Strait of
20 Charles Liu, Chinese SovereigntJ and Joint Development: A Pragmatic Sohttion to the Sprat!! Islands 18
Lay. L.A. INT'L & COMPoL. J. 865 (1996); Mito, infra note 98.
21 A number of nations, particularly the Philippines, object to the name "South China Sea", in that
it implies Chinese sovereignty over the sea, which they dispute. Ironically, the Chinese name for the sea
does not contain the name "China" in it The use of the term in this paper is merely descriptive and
follows most literature on the subject. This paper recognizes the political sensitivity of using this term.
Throughout this paper, the names of the various fearures of the South China Sea will be proceeded by
the respective names given by the other countries, if available. See CHEMILLIER-GENDREU,sHjJranote 6
at 15.
zz More specifically, it refers to the area south of Hainan Island. The South China Sea is defmed by
the International Hydrographic Bureau as the body of water stretching in a Southwest to Northeast
direction, whose southern border is 3 degrees South latitude between South Sumatra and Kalimantan
(Karimata Straits), and whose northern border is the Strait of Taiwan from the northern tip of Taiwan
to the Fukien coast of China. Omar Saleem, The Sprat!! Islands Displlte: China Difines the New MiUenillm 15
AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 527, 530 (2000).
THINKING OUTSIDE THE Box:
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE AND THE UNCLOS
Malacca in the southwest, to the Strait of Taiwan in the northeast. The
South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea23encompassing an area of around
3,500,000 km2 bordering several countries.24
The South China Sea Islands is an archipelago25 of over 250
islands,26atolls,27cays, shoals, reefs,28and sandbars, most of which have no
native inhabitants. The islands of the South China Sea can be further
subdivided into four sub-archipelagos, listed by area size: (1) The Sprady
23 The LOS CONVENTION in Article 122 defmes an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea as: "A gulf,
basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow
oudet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or
more coastal States." Article 123 of the Los CONVENTION underlines the duty of States bordering on
enclosed or semi-enclosed seas to cooperate in the conservation, management, exploration and
exploitation of the living marine resources; See VIVIAN LoUIS FORBES,CONFLICTAND COOPERATION
IN MANAGINGMARITIMESPACEIN SEMI-ENCLOSEDSEAS135, 243 (1997).
24 The sea is bordered by Bomeo to the south; China and Taiwan to the north; Vietnam, Thailand
and Peninsular Malaysia to the west, and the J:'hilippines to th~ east. It encompasses a continuation of
the Pacific Ocean stretching roughly from Singapore and the Straits of Malacca in the southwest, to the
Straits of Taiwan (between Taiwan and China) in the northeast.
25 The Los CONVENTION in Article 46 defmes an archipelagic State as "a State constituted wholly by
one or more archipelagos and may include other islands;" and an archipelago as "a group of islands,
including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely
interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic
and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such." For academic literature on the
regime of archipelagoes in intemationallaw, see W. H. Mcconnell, The Legal Regime of Archipelagoes, 35
SASKATCHEWANL. REv. 121 (1970), C. F. Amerasinghe, The Probkm of Archipelagoes in the International
Law of the Sea, 23 INT'L & COMPoL. Q. 539 (1974); MOHAMMED MUNAVVAR, OCEAN STATES:
ARanPELAGIC REGIMES IN THE LAw OF THE SEA (1995); D. P. O'connel, Mid-Ocean Archipelagoes in
International Law, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1971); Miriam Defensor Santiago, The Archipelago Concept in
the Law of the Sea: Probkms and Perspectives 491'HIL. L. J. 315 (1974).
26 The Los CONVENTION defmes an island in Article 121. Almost all the islands in the South
China Sea have land areas rarely exceeding 1 km'. An island is any piece of land smaller than a
continent and larger than a rock that is completely surrounded by water. Very small islands are called
islets. Although seldom adhered to, it is also proper to call an emergent land feature on an atoll an islet,
since an atoll is a type of island. A key or cay is also another name for a relatively small island. Groups of
related islands are called archipelagos. There are three main types of islands: continental islands, river
islands, and volcanic islands. There are also some artificial islands. Wikipedia, South China Sea Islands,
available online: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_China_Sea_Islands. [Hereinafter SOUTH CHINA
SEAISLANDS]
27 An atoll is a type of low, coral island found in the tropical ocean consisting of a coral-algal reef
surrounding a central depression. The depression may be part of the emergent island or part of the s.ea
(that is, a lagoon), or more rarely an enclosed body of fresh, brackish, or highly saline water. SOUTII
CWNA SEA ISLANDS,it!.
28 In nautical parlance, a reef is a rock, sandbar, or other feature beneath the surface of the water,
but shallow enough to be a hazard to ships. Many reefs result from abiotic processes--deposition of
sands, wave erosion planning down rock outcrops-but the best-known reefs are those of tropical
waters developed through biotic processes dominated by corals and calcareous algae. SOUTII CHINA
SEAISLANDS,it!.
Islands;29 (2) the Macclesfield Islands;30 (3) the Paracel Islands;3\ and (4) the
Pratas Islands.32 The majority of the disputed islands are located in the
Paracel and Spratly Island chains.33
The greater number of these islands are partially submerged islets,
rocks, and reefs that are little more than navigational hazards not suitable
for habitation.34 These islands, however, are important for strategic,
political and economic reasons.
29 The Sprntly Islands, which the Chinese call nanshd qundtio or "Southern sands"; the Vietnamese
call the TIOO ng Sa or "Long Sands" and the Filipinos call the Kalqyaan or "Freedom", are a disputed
group of approximately 100 reefs and islets in the South China Sea. The Sprntlys are surrounded by rich
fishing grounds and ga.~and oil deposits. The People's Republic of China (pRC), the Republic of China
(faiwan), and Vietnam each claim sovereignty over the entire group, while Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Brunei claim parts of the group. Several of the nations involved have soldiers stationed in the Spratlys:
the PRC has about 450 troops, Malaysia 70-90, the Philippines about 100, and Vietnam about 1,500.
Taiwan also maintains a military presence in the group's largest island, ltu Aba. SOlITH CHINA SEA
ISLANDS,id.
:lO MacClesfield Bank (which the Chinese call as Zhongsha Qllndao or literally Central Sand Islands) is
an elongated atoll of underwater reefs and shoals in South China Sea and part of the disputed South
China Sea Islands. It is claimed by the Republic of China, the People's Republic of China, and Vietnam.
It is located ESE of the Paracel Islands, distantly SW of the Pratas Islands and north of the Spratly
Islands. There are no military stations here. It's a rich fishing ground and difficult to navigate due to the
shallow submerged reefs.
11 The Paracel Islands (which the Chinese call the Xisha Islands and the Vietnamese call Hoang Sa)
are a group of small islands and reefs in the South China Sea and part of the South China Sea Islands,
about one-third of the way from central Vietnam to the northern Philippines. SOlITH CHINA SEA
ISLANDS,id.
The Parace! Islands are surrounded by productive fishing grounds and by potential oil and gas
reserves. In 1932, French Indochina annexed the islands and set up a weather station on Pattle Island;
maintenance was continued by its successor, Vietnam The People's Republic of China has occupied the
Paracel Islands since 1974, when its troops seized a South Vietnamese garrison occupying the western
islands. The islands are claimed by the Republic of China (faiwan) and Vietnam SOlITH CHINA SEA
ISLANDS,id.
The islands have no indigenous inhabitants. The PRC announced plans in 1997 to open the islands
for tourism The small Chinese port facilitjes on Woody Island and Duncan Island are being expanded.
There is one airport. SOlITH CHINA SEAISLANDS,id.
32 The Prntas Islands (which the Chinese call the Dongsha Islands or "East Sand Islands'') are
located in the middle of the South China Sea. It has historically been uninhabited, and nations like China
and Japan claimed it to be their overseas territory. After World War II, the islands and the sea area
around it were mandated by United Nations. Today they are administered by the Republic of China and
even assigns the place a postal code (817). Soum CHINA SEAISLANDS,ibid.
33 The Spratlys links the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. All its islands are coral, low and
small, about 5 to 6 meters above water, spread over 160,000 to 180,000 square kilometers of sea zone
(or 12 times that of the Paracels), with a total land area of 10 square kilometers only. The Parace!s also
has a total land area of 10 square kilometers spread over a sea zone of 15,000 to 16,000 square
kilometers. Soum CHINA SEAISLANDS,id.
34 The islands of the South China Sea sits on a shallow humite-layer continental shelf with an
average of 200 metres deep. However, in the Spratlys, the sea floor drastically change its height in
thousands, and near the Philippines, the Palawan Trough is more than 5,000 metres deep. Also, there
are some parts that are so shallow that navigation becomes difficult, and prone to accidents. Soum
CHINA SEA ISLANDS,id.
THINKING OUTSIDE THE Box:
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE AND THE UNCLOS
The South China Sea region is strategically located.35It is a major
international artery for trade, transportation and military affairs.36 The
South China Sea is the world's second busiest international sea laneY Over
half of the world's supertanker traffic passes through the region's waters.
This is the reason why the stability of the region and the assurance of
unimpeded freedom of navigation within its waters hold vital global
significance.
The South China Sea is rich in natural resources. The conflicting
territorial claims to establish sovereignty over tlrese islands are vital to claim
their surrounding sea and their resources. Aside from its hydrocarbon
potential in terms of oil and natural gas, the South China Sea is also a
valuable marine resource,38 The total fisheries production of the South
China Sea is estimated at 30 million tons annually, with a mere 13 percent
currently harvested.39The vast ecological ecosystem of the South China
Sea,40being home to more 70 coral genera,41is one of the most productive
areas for commercial fisheries in the world.42
35 Christopher C. Joyner, The Spratfy Islands Dispute: &thinking the Intetplqy '!flAw, Diplomary, and Geo-
politics in the South China Sea 13 INT'LJ. MAR. & COAST.L. 193 (1998).
36 JOHN H. NOER, CHOKEPOINTS: MARITIMEECONOMlC CONCERNS IN SOUTHEASTASIA 1
(1996). [Hereinafter NOER]
31 In terms of world annual merchant fleet tonnage, over 50% passes through the straits of
Malacca, the Sunda Strait, and the Lombok Strait. Over 1.6 million m' (10 million barrels) of crude oil a
day are shipped through the Strait of Malacca, where there are regular reports of piracy, but much less
frequently than before the mid-20th century. NOER, id at 1.
38 SUSUMUKUME, TuNA REsOURCESIN THE SOUTHCHINA SEA (1973); TSUNEO AOYAMA,THE
DEMERSAL FISH STOCKS AND FISHERIES OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (1973); D. MENASVETA, S.
SHINDO AND S. CHULLARSORN,PELAGIC FISHERY REsOURCES OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND
PROSPECTSFOR THEIR DEVELOPMENT (1973); M. N. MISTAKIDIS,THE CRUSTACEANREsOURCES
ANDRELATEDFISHERIESIN THE COUNTRIESBORDERINGTHE"SOUTHCHINA SEA(1973).
39 World Resources Institute, South China Sea: Spratfy and Paracel Islands, citing LAURETTABURKE,
ET AL., REEFS AT RISK IN SOUTHEASTASIA (2002), and D. Pauly & V. Christensen, Stratified Models '!f
lAfJ!f'Marine Ecosystems: A General Approach and An Application to the South China Sea, in LARGE MARINE
ECOSYSTEMS:STRESS, MITIGATION AND SUSTAINABIUTY148-74 (K. Sherman, et aI. eds., 1993)
available online at <http://marine.wri.org/puhs_contenCtext.cfm?ContentID=108> [Hereinafter
WORLD REsOURCESINSTITUTE].
40 J.E.N. VERON, CORALSIN SPACEAND TIME: THE BIOGEOGRAPHYAND EVOLUTION OF THE
SCLERACTINIA321 (1995); P.M. Aliiio et aI., The Fisheries Potential '!fthe Kalqyaan Island Group, South China
Sea, in THE MARINE BIOLOGY OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD
In the whole, the hydrocarbon resources in the South China Sea is
marked by exaggerated optimism and conflicting estimates43 The most
optimistic Chinese estimate suggests that potential oil resources (not proved
reserves) of the Spratly and Paracel Islands could be as high as 105 billion
barrels of oil, and that the total for the South China Sea could be as high as
213 billion barrels.44 Even on the hope that 10% of this potential resource
can be economically recovered, the Chinese estimates imply potential
production levels for the Spratly Islands of 1.9 million barrels/ day.45
The speculation that the region contains extensive hydrocarbon
deposits is hardly supported by any evidence independent of the claims of
China. The optimism of China with respect to the hydrocarbon p.otential of
the South China Sea is not shared by non-Chinese -analysts.46The United
States Geological Survey estimated the sum total of discovered reserves and
undiscovered resources in the offshore basins of the South China Sea at 28
billion barrels. The United States Energy Information Administration
statistics state that the region has proven oil reserves of around 1.2 km3 (1.7
billion barrels), with an estimate of 4.5 km3 (28 billion barrels) in total.
Natural gas reserves are estimated to total around 7,500 km3 (266 trillion
cubic feet).
INTERNATIONALCONFERENCE ON 1HE MARINE BIOLOGY OF 1HE SOUlH CHINA SEA 219-25 (B.
Morton, ed., 1998). !d.
41 MARK SPAIDING, ET AL, EDS., WORlD MANGROVEATLAS(1997); TOMASTOMASCIKET AL,
EDS., THE EcOWGY OF 1HE INDONESIANSEAS(1997).
42 Herminio R. Rabanal & Ruben Ganaden, The Contestfor Fishery ReSOlirces in the SOllth China Sea, in
THE SOUlH CHINA SEA DISPUTES:PmUPPINE PERSPECTIVES37 - 47 (Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, ed.,
1992). [Hereinafter BAVIERA].
43 For a detailed discussion on the hydrocarbon potential in the region and other related issues, see
MARK J VALENCIA, SOUTH-EAST AsIAN SEAS: OIL UNDER TROUBLED WATERS (HYDROCARBON
POTENTIAL, JURISDICTIONALISSUESAND INTERNATIONALRELATIONS (1985). See also MARK J.
VALENCIA,ET. AL., EDS. SHIPPING, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT:SOUlHEAST AsIAN PERSPECTIVES
FORTHE EIGHTIES (1982).
44 Please see Table 4, United States Energy Information Administration, SOllth China Sea Tables and
Maps, online: http://www .eia.doe.gov / emeu/ cabs/ schinatab.htrnl.
45 Ths estimate, if founded, would make the South China Sea oil reserves 20 percent of global oil
reserve figures. ld.
46 Noel L. Caagusan, The Contest for Energy ReSOlirces in BAVIERA, s"!'ra note 42 at 26 - 32. See
especially, Teodoro M. Santos, Reactions in BAVIERA,s"!'ra note 42 at 33 - 35.
THINKING OUTSIDE THE Box:
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE AND THE UNCLOS
The issue of the South China Sea is complex for the following
reasons: first, because of the number of parties directly47 and indirectly
involved;48 second, because of its geo-politica149 and strategic importance;50
and third, because of its economic resource potential.51
The characterization, nay obsession, of scholars, diplomats, policy
makers and analysts, of the dispute over the islands of the South China Sea
as primarily or mainly a legal question is far too simplistic and must be
rejected. At the core of the legal nature of the dispute is the issue of
sovereignty over the South China Sea which obscures other issues.52
The debate is likewise puerile because scholars argue the issue from
the viewpoint of the contesting states.53 The legal facet of the issue is just
one among many. There are other potential points for cooperation and
mutual agreement. For example, the following areas may offer some
promise: marine scientific research, marine environmental protection,54
safety of navigation and communication,55 resource assessment and means
of development.
47 See espeeially HANNS J. BUCHHOLZ,LAw OF THE SEA ZONES IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN 30 - 56
(1987).
48 See e.g. Richard D. Beller, Analy?ing the R£lationship Between International Law and International Politkr
in China's and Vietnam~r Di.rpute Over the Spratly Irland.r 29 TEx. INT'L L. J. 293 (1994). See also Ji Guoxing,
RiJugh Waters in the South China Sea: Navigation Issues and Confidence-Building Mea.rureJ, 53 ASIAPAC. ISSUES1
(2001).
49 LIMJOO-JOCK, GEO-STRATEGYANDTHE SOUTHCHINA SEABASIN (1979).
50 See Liselotte Odgaard, Detemnce and Co-opemtion in the South China Sea, 23 CONTEMP S.E. ASIA
292 (2001). The article argues that the Spratlys dispute promotes the emergence of a regional order
combining deterrence with consultation and limited cooperation. For an examination of China's policy
towards the South China Sea after the post-Cold War era, see Shee Poon Kim, The South China Sea in
China's Strategif Thinking, 19 CONTEMP. S.E. ASIA 369 (1998).
51 BOB CATLEY& MAKMURKELlAT, SPRATLYS:THE DISPUTE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 44-
59 (1997).
52 TOWNSEND, supm note 16 at 9.
53 This raises serious issues of academic objectivity as well. The great bulk of the scholarly material
on the South China Sea is invariably by Chinese scholars. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the
positions these scholars write is that of China's. It is not suggested that one's nationality is an automatic
source of bias, but that the reader should be wary of work which are scholarly in appearance but
contains political propaganda. See, LENI STENSETH,NATIONALISMAND FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASE
OF CHINA'SNANSHARHETORIC(1998).
54 DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, ENVIRONMENTALMANAGEMENT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA:
LEGALAND INSTITUTIONALDEVELOPMENTS(1982).
55 Ramses Amer, Towardr a Declaration on "Navigational Right.r" in the Sea-lanes if the Asia-Paei/it; 20
CONTEMP.S.E. AsIA 88 (1998).
The general climate in the South China Sea can be characterized as
one of subdued hostility. There are a number of factors that can account
for this: first, the increasing recognition of multilateralism especially within
the aegis of ASEAN; second, the exercise of military restraint and
pragmatic diplomacy among all claimant countries; and third, the various
multilateral declarations and joint statements produced through the
proliferation of opportunities for regional dialogue and forum on a broad
range of issues all contribute to this current state.56
The South China Sea region has been the stage for a number of
recent developments.57 The situation in the region is largely a function of
the interplay of the various activities and counter-activities of the claimant
countries. These actions can be characterized as mainly individual attempts
from all of the claimant countries to reinforce their respective territorial
claims; maintain and strengthen existing control over occupied territories;
and prevent encroachment.
In addition, the state of affairs within the South China Sea, is also
influenced by both regional and global factors.58 These same factors
impinge upon and shape the foreign policy directions of the claimant
countries. In the recent past military tension that sometimes led to violence
mar the dynamics of geopolitics in the region. 59 Currently, however, there
seems to be an emergent trend towards cooperation.
This paper will not elaborate on the military tension and skirmishes
mentioned briefly above.60 This section will discuss the Declaration on the
Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, and the joint seismic exploration
agreement by China, Vietnam and the Philippines, both recent
developments of notable significance to the South China Sea issue.
56 For example, Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between
ASEAN and China, Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural Cooperation, Joint Declaration of
ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues, among others. See
ASEAN Secretariat Website, online: http://www.aseansec.org/home.htm.
57 See especialfy, Yann-Huei Song, The Soulh China Sea in Ihe New Millennium: Befort and After Ibe
Seplember 11 Terrorirl Attacks, 34 OCEAN DEV. & INTL L. 229, 239 -245 (2003).
58 MARK J. VALENCIA, CHINA AND TIlE SOUlli CHINA SEA DISPUTES: CONFLIcnNG CLAIMS
ANDPOTENTIALSOLUTIONSIN lliE Soum CHINA SEA 3 (1995).
59 See e.g. discussion in CHI-KIN La, CHINA'S PoUCY TOWARDSTERRITORIALDISPUTES (THE
CASE OF lliE SOum CHINA SEA ISLANDS).84 - 132 (1989) detailing China's disputes with Hanoi
during the turbulent decade of 1974 -1984. See also SAMUELS,supm note 14 at 98 -110.
60 See e.g., Ian James Storey, Crteping AsserliV<ness: China, lbe Pbilippines and lbe Soulb Cbina Sea 21
CONTEMP. S.E. AsIA 95 (1999).
THINKING OUTSIDE THE Box:
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE AND THE UNCLOS
1. The Declaration on the Code of Conduct for the South
China Sea
The Declaration on the Code of Conduct for the South China
Sea,61signed by the ASEAN62 and China on 2 November 2002,63is a
milestone in many respects. This is the fIrst time that China has signed a
multilateral agreement on the issue of the South China Sea.64 The
Declaration is a testimony to regional efforts that spanned almost a decade
of intense negotiations.65It underscored the importance of regional security
61 For a concise background on the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,
see Wu Shicun, & Ren Huaifeng, More than a Declaration: A Commentary on the Background and the Significance
of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in tbe South China Sea, 2 CHINESE)' INT'LL. 311 (2003).
62 ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, was established by the ASEAN
Declaration of August 8, 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with five founding members: Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, and "Thailand. Brunei Darussalam was admitted as the sixth member of
ASEAN by the Declaration of January 7, 1984 in Jakarta, and Vietnam became the seventh member on
July 28, 1995. Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, and Laos were unanimously approved to join ASEAN in
December 1995. Burma became the eighth and Laos the ninth member of ASEAN on July 23,1997 as
ASEAN celebrated its 30th anniversary. Cambodia became ASEAN's tenth member on April 30, 1999.
See ASEAN's home page, online: <http://www.aseansec.org/history/overview.htm>.
63 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed on 4 November 2002
during the Eighth ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia by leaders of ASEAN and China. Full
text available online: < http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm>. [Hereinafter SCS DECLARATION]
64 In June 2003, Beijing signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a dispute procedure
instituted within the ASEAN countries in June 1976 thereby agreeing not to "participate in any activity
which shall constitute a threat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity"
of the other signatory states. See website of the ASEAN Secretariat, online:
<http://www.aseansec.org/home.htm> .
Taiwan, one of the six parties directly involved in the sovereignty and maritime jurisdictional
dispute in the South China Sea, was excluded from the regional efforts to formulate the code of conduct
because of ASEAN's adherence to the "One-China Policy." Taiwan has also been barred from
participating in other regional security dialogue processes, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARl').
For a discussion of the position of Taiwan on this issue, please see Yann-Huei Song, Codes of Conduct in
the South China Sea and Taiwan's Stand 24 MARINEPOL'y 449 (2000).
65 It was in the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea of 1992 that a possible code of
conduct was first mentioned which provides that all parties are to apply the principles contained in the
Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (TAC) as the basis for establishing a code of
international conduct for the South China Sea. Paragraph 11 of The Joint Communique of the 29th
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, held in Jakarta in 1996, in Paragraph 11 "endorsed the idea of concluding a
regional code of conduct in the South China Sea which will lay the foundation fer lone [sic] term
stability in the area and foster understanding among claimant countries." The Declaration of Hanoi, in
paragraph 7,6 adopted at the Si."th ASEAN Summit in 1998 called for the ASEAN members countries
to promote efforts for establishing a regional code of conduct in the South China Sea. The initiative to
have an ASEAN-China code of conduct, proposed by ASEAN in Kuarnin, China, on 6 April 1999,
commenced the process of negotiations between Beijing and ASEAN member countries on the future
of a code of conduct for the region. The Joint Communique of the 35th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting,
held in Bandar Seri Begawan in 2002, in paragraph 40 reaffirmed "that the adoption of a code of
and the establishment of mutual trust and confidence among all the
claimant countries. Towards this end, the Declaration reafftrmed the
commitment of all the claimant countries to universally-recognized
principles of international law including the Charter of the United
Nations,66 and the LOS Convention.67
The Declaration clearly enunciates the agreement of the states "to
resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means,
without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly
consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in
accordance with universally recognized principles of international law,
including the LOS Convention." The states also pledged "to exercise self-
restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate
disputes and affect peace and stability" by refraining from inhabiting
presently uninhabited features.68
It must be added that the Declaration is a political document, and
consequently, not legally binding.69 It does not resolve the competing claims
of territorial sovereignty issues in the South China Sea nor does it impose
any enforceable obligations on the parties. However, the greater
significance of the Declaration lies in the commitment of the parties to the
maintenance of peace and stability, which are requisites to regional growth
and development. The Declaration evinces the intent of all the parties to
sustain negotiations conducted in good faith towards the eventual
resolution of the issue. Most importantly, the Declaration has substantially
improved the level of trust and confidence among the claimant countries
and has been instrumental in other bilateral and multilateral initiatives that
build upon its principles.70
conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agreed to
work towards a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea." Please see Nguyen
Hong Thao, The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: A Note, 34 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 279, 279 - 280 (2003).
66 Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031; TS 993; 3 Bevans 1153.
67 Preamble of the SCS DECLARATION,supra note 63. The SCS DECLARATIONlikewise affirmed
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia between ASEAN members in 1976 and the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
68 SCS DECLARA110N, supra note 63.
69 Leszek Buszynski, ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China Sea, 25 CONTEMP. S.E.
ASIA 343 (2003). See also, Nguyen Hong Thao, Vietnam and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea 32
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 105 (2000).
70 For example, the Joint Oceanographic Marine Scientific E"pedition in the South China Sea
OOMSRE-SCS), an initiative launched by Vietnam and the Philippines has been implemented since
1996. The first expedition was undertaken in April 1996, the second in May 2000, third in April 2005
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2. China-Vietnam-Philippine Joint Seismic Exploration
Agreement
On September 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and his
Vietnamese counterpart Phan Van Khai, together with Philippine President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, agreed to conduct a joint survey of possible oil
deposits in areas they all claim in the South China Sea.71In addition, the
three countries also agreed to enhance consultation and cooperation on
border issues.72
The three-nation accord on the joint exploration over the disputed
areas on the South China Sea -- safely called the Joint Marine Seismic
Undertaking GMSU) -- was forged during the sidelines of the second
summit of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation
in Kunming, the capital of southwest China's Yunnan Province, where the
summit was held. The JMSU is actually characterized as a "marine scientific
research," a confidence building measure outlined in the SCS Declaration.73
The pact merely covers a pre-exploration study for the sole
purpose of collecting, processing and analyzing seismic data and does not
include drilling or development nor is there reference to joint petroleum
production, a reality emphasized in a communique by the Philippine
Government.74 Cooperative agreements of this nature are actually
specifically permitted under the SCS Declaration.75 And, most important of
even had American and Canadian participants. In April 2007, for JOMSRE-SCS IV, China expressed its
willingness to join as a signatory to the Declaration on Code of Conduct on the South China Sea and
Korea showed interest to learn the experience of JOMSRE-SCS for its own dispute in the Japanese Sea.
71Radio Free Asia, China, Philippines, Vietnam Sign Joint SoHlh Chi1llJ Sea Oil Search Accord, 14 March
2005. Available online:
http://www .rfa.org/ english/ news/business/2005/03/14/ china_ vietnam_spratlys/.
n Xinhua News Agency, Pledge for Joint S. Chipa Sea Exploitation Repeated, July 20, 2005. Online at:
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Jul/135427.htm.
73Ian Storey, China and the Philippines: Moving Bryond the SoHlh Chino Sea Dispute, 6 China Brief (16
August 2006), available online:
http://www. jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3837 &article_id=2371
392
74Alan Boyd, Oil Wom'es LNbricate South China Sea Pact, Asia Times Online, 4 September 2004.
Online at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FI04Ad04.html.
7SSCS DECLARATION,supra note 63, which states:
"xxx
6. Pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the disputes, the Parties
concerned may explore or undertake cooperative activities. These may include the
following: a. marine environmental protection; b. marine scientific research; c. safety of
all, the legal caveat that the agreement is without prejudice to their
respective territorial claims in the South China Sea.
The national oil companies from the three countries -- China
National Offshore Oil Corporation, Philippine National Oil Corporation
and PetroVietnam -- have agreed to conduct joint pre-exploration seismic
surveys of the South China Seawith each country contributing $5 million to
the $15 million initial cost of the three-year project. The tri-partite
agreement covers an area of about 143,000 square kms. (55,000 square
miles).?6
It is fairly obvious that the energy security of all the individual
claimant countries and even the South-east Asian region as a whole is one
of the most major driving factors in the South China Sea issue.?? Since
energy demands, much like the hydrocarbon deposits in the South China
Sea, are independent of the boundary disputes between the claimant
countries, it will be for the benefit of all parties to cooperate in multilateral
initiatives which temporarily shelve territorial claims and further goals that
transcend the question of sovereignty.?8 Ultimately, a comprehensive
arrangement along the same lines embodied in a legally-bindingmultilateral
instrument in respect of the South China Sea has the greatest potential to
improve political, military and economic stability throughout the region.
navigation and communication at sea; d. search and rescue operation; and e. combating
transnational crime, including but not limited to trafficking in illicit drugs, piracy and armed
robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms. The modalities, scope and locations, in respect of
bilateral and multilateral cooperation should be agreed upon by the Parties concerned prior
to their actual implementation (emphasis supplied)."
76 Ling Zhu, Joint Exploration Project in SOllth China Sea Finishes 1st Phase, 17 November 2005.
Available online at the Chinese Government's official web portal:
http://english.gov.cn/ chinatoday 12005-11/17 1contenc100828.htrn.
n Clive Schofield & Ian Storey, Energy SeCllrity and SOlltheast Asia: the Impact on Maritime BOllndary and
Territorial Displltes, 9 HARV. AsIA Q. 36 (2005). The ever-increasing demand for oil to support China's
growing economy has driven China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to partner with U.S.
Devon Energy Corporation to develop oil and natusal gas reserves in the eastern part of the South
China Sea, the fourth deal on deep sea oil exploitation that CNOOC has signed with foreign partners.
See Yingling Liu, China, U.S. Join in Oil and Gas Development in SOllth China Sea, December 9, 2005.
Available online at: http://www.worldwatch.org/node/1469.
7. Mark Valencia, China'J Pllsl;for O./fslxm Energy RUOllfrCShas Implications for T ai_n's National SeCllrity
and Energy Policy, Taiwan Review, 1 January 2006. Online at:
http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=1167&CtNode=128. Chinese Embassy in the Philippines,
Oil Companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam .rignedAgmment on S oJ/th China Sea Cooperation, 15 March
2005. Available online: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t187333.htm
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The six nations that have overlapping and conflicting claims over
the islands that speck the South China Sea: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, all base their claims on principles of
international law, both customary and conventional, and in particular on
provisions of the LOS Convention. These principles are principally
discovery and effective occupation,79
Inasmuch as the focus of this paper is not on the validity of the
respective claims nor of their relative strengths and weaknesses vis-a.-vis
each other, this section will be brief. This section aims: first, to provide the
basis of the claim of each of the claimant countries; and second, to give a
short analysis of each claim.
A. The Claimant Countries and the Basis of their Respective
Claims
The People's Republic of China (pRC) claims territorial sovereignty
over the entire South China Sea.80 The PRC primarily anchors its claim on
the principle of discovery on the basis of historical records that date as far
back as the 200 B.C.8! China also relies on the 1887 Treaty between France
79 For academic literature on the acquisition of territory in intemationallaw, .feeJohn Mchugo, How
to Prove Title to Terntory: A Brief, Prat'lical Introduction to the uw and Evidence, 2(4) BOUNDARY &
'fERlUTORYBRIEFING (1998); Georg Schwarzenberger, Title to Terntory: Ruponse to a Challenge, 51 AM. J
INT'L L. 308 (1957);JG. Starke, The Acquisition of Title to Temiory I!J New!J Eme'll,ed StateJ, 41 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 411 (1965-1966); JOSHUA CASTELLINO & STEVE ALLEN, TITI..E TO 'fERlUTORY IN
INTERNATIONALLAW:ATEMPORAL ANALYSIS(2003).
80 For an analysis of the traditional Chinese maritime boundary in the South China Sea (the
Chinese broken u-shaped line), please see Peter Kien-Hong Yu, The Chinese (Broken) U-ShaJMd Line in the
South China Sea: Points, Lines and Zones, 25 CONTEMP. S.E. AsIA 405 (2003). For a the history of the
creation and the opinions that have been expressed conceming the juridical status of the dotted line, see
LiJinming & Li Dexia, The Dolled Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note 34 OCEAN DEV.
& INT'L L. 287 (2003). The PRC claims the waters within these lines as historic waters, which to China
is akin to the concept of "internal waters" and signifies ownership of all the living and non-living
resources within these lines. See also Zou Keyuan, The ChineJe Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the
South China Sea and Its Legal Consequemu for the Resolution of the Dispute over the Sprat!J Islands, 14 INT'L J
MAR. & COAST.L. 52 (1997).
81 The academic literature by Chinese scholars in support of the Chinese claim is numerous, well-
documented and voluminous. See for example, Jianming Shen, China's Sovereignry Ol,.r the South China Sea
Islands: A Historical Perspective 1 CHINESEJ INT'L L. 94 (2002); Jianming Shen, International uw Rules and
and China, which delimited the territories of China and Vietnam, which was
then a French protectorate.82 China maintains troops on at least seven of
the islands83 since 1988 and has erected structures on some of them,
including a naval airfield on Fiery Cross Reef.
The claim of Taiwan to the South China Sea is based on the
principles of discovery and occupation.84 In 1946, Taiwan was the first to
establish its presence in the Spratlys following the Japanese withdrawal after
World War II. It has physically occupied and exercised sovereignty over Itu
Aba, the largest island in the Spratlys chain since 1956.85
The claim of Vietnam covers an extensive area of the South China
Sea including all of the Spratly Islands.86 The Vietnamese claim is based on
historical evidence and its right of succession to the French- claim.87
Currently, Vietnam occupies twenty-three of the Spratly Islands.88
Hi.rtorical Evidences Supporting China's Title to the South China Sea Islands, 21 HASTING INT'L & COMPoL.
REv. 1 (1997-1998); Chang The-Kuang, China~ •. Claim of Sovmignt; Over Spratfy and Paracel Island •.: A
Historical and Legal Perspective, 23 CASEW. REs. J. INT'L L. 399 (1991), among others.
82 Hungdah Chiu & Choon-Ho Park, Legal Status of the Para,d and Spratfy Islands, 3 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 1, 11 (1975) citing the Convention Respecting the Delimitation of the Frontier Between China
and Tonkin (Vietnam), signed on June 26,1887. The 1887 Treaty created a boundary line ("west of 105
degrees 43 minutes east of Paris") which ceded to the China all territory east of this line. China posits
that since the Spratlys lie east of this line, it belongs to China. On this point, ."ee alro Brian K. Murphy,
Comment, Dangerou .•.Ground' The Spratfy Island •.and International Law, 1 OCEAN & COASTALL. J. 187, 191
(1995).
83 China controls the following islands in the Spratlys: (1) Da Chu Thap (Fiery Cross Reef); (2) Da
Chau Vien (Cuarteron Reef); (3) Da Gac Ma Oohnson Reef); (4) Da Hu-go (Hughes Reef); (5) Da
Gaven (Gaven Reef); (6) Da Su-bi (Subi Reef); and (7) Mischief Reef. Manuel J. Lasema, Jr., The Spratfys:
Legal Basi .•. of the Claim of the Socialist Rtpublic of Vietnam, available online at Pinoylaw.com:
http://www.pinoylaw.com/library / features/The%20Spratlys, %20Legal%20Basis%200f%20the%20Clai
ms%200f%20Vietnam%20and%20the%20Philippines.htm. [Hereinafter LASERNA].
84 China incorporates the claim of Taiwan into its own because China does not recognize Taiwan
as an independent state separate from the PRe. See Michael Bennet, The People '.•.Rtpublic of China and the
u',e of International Law in the Spratfy Island •.Di.rpute, 28 STAN.J. INT'L L. 425, 448 (1992).
85 Cheng-Yi Lin, Taiwan's South China Sea Poliry 37 ASIANSURV.323 - 325 (1997).
86 For a discussion of the policy of Vietnam in the South China Sea and its use of the Los
CONVENTION to establish its claim on the entire of the Paracel and the Spratly islands, see Stein
Tonneson, Vietnam' .•.Objectit'Cin the South China Sea: National or Rtgional Securit;?, 22 CONTEMP. S.E. ASIA
199 (2000).
87 Vietnam asserts its historical ties with the Spratly Islands can be traced as far back as A.D. 1650.
It also maintains that it succeeded Fra~ce's 1933 Spratly claim despite France's insistence that it never
ceded the Spratlys to Vietnam. Vietnam made its first modem declaration of sovereignty over the
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The Philippines principally bases its claim on the principle of
discovery.89The Philippines asserts that the Spratly Islands were terra nullius
when Tomas Cloma, a Filipino lawyer and businessman, discovered them in
1947.90 The Philippine claim to the Spratlys has clearly deftned coordinates.
The Philippines occupies 8 islands91which it refers as the Kalayaan Island
Group, which was made a part of Palawan Province by Presidential Decree
in 1972.92
Malaysia claims and occupies three islands in the southern portion
of the Spratlys based on the principle of geographic proximity founded on
the continental shelf principle.93Malaysia argues that these islands lie within
Spratlys at the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference. In 1956, South Vietnam strongly protested the
Philippine explorer Tomas Cloma's alleged discovery of the Spratlys. For a discussion of the policy of
Vietnam in the South China Sea and its use of the Los CONVENTION to establish its claim on the entire
of the Parace! and the Spratly islands, see Tonneson, id.
88 In the Spratlys, Vietnam controls the following islands, reefs, shoals, and cays: (1) Da Lat (Ladd
Reef); (2) Dao Truong Sa (Spratly Island); (3) Da Tay (West London Reef); (4) Da Giua (Central
London Reef); (5) Da Dong (East London Reef); (6) Dao An Bang (Amboyan Reef); (7) Thuyen Chai
(Barque Canada Reef); (8) Da Phan Vinh (pearson Reef); (9) Bai Toc Tan (Alison Reef) (10) Da Nui Le
(Cornwallis South Reef); (11) Da Tien Nu (Tennent Reef); (12) Da Lon (Great Discovery Reef); (13) Da
Len Dao (Landsdowne Reef); (14) Da Hi Gen; (15) Dao Sinh Ton (Sin Cowe Island); (16) Da Gri-san;
(17) Dao Nam Yet (Namyit Island); (18) Dao Son Ca (Sand Cay); (19) Da Nui Thi (petley Reef); (20)
Dao Song Tu Tay (South West Cay); and (21) Da Nam (South Reef). LASERNA;sII/Jra note 83.
89 For a more thorough discussion of the Philippine claim, please see Haydee Yorac, The Philippine
Claim to the Sprat/y Islands Groll/J, 58 PHIL. L. J. 172 (1983). Also see BAVIERA,sII/Jra note 42 at 10 - 17;
52- 53.
90 JUAN ARREGLADO,KALAYAAN:HISTORICAL,LEGAL, POLITICALBACKGROUND(1982).
91 The islands occupied by the Philippines: (1) Dao Song Tu Dong (parola or North East Cay); (2)
Dao Dua (Ben Lac) (Likas or West York Island); (3) Dao Thi Tu (pag-asa orThitu Island); (4) Dao Binh
Nguyen (patag or Flat Island); (5) Dao Vinh Vien (Lawak or Nansham Island); (6) Dao Cong Do (Rizal
or Commodore Reef); (7) Con San Ho Lan Can (panata or Lamkian Cay); and (8) Dao Loai Ta (Kota or
Loaita Island). LASERNA,sII/Jra note 83.
92 On 11 June 1978, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1596, placing most of the islands,
cays, shoals, and reefs within Philippine territory and naming them collectively as the "Kalt[yaan bland
Groll/J". These have been integrated as a municipality of the province of Palawan. Presidential Decree
1596 and Presidential Decree 1599, proclaiming a 200-mile exclusive economic zone for the Philippines
also include the Kalayaan Island Group. The Philippine Government registered its claim with the United
Nations Secretariat on May 20, 1980, with a technical description of Kalayaan. See Yorac, sll/JrtJ note 89
at 44- 46.
93 Malaysia controls the following islands in the Spratlys: (1) Da Ky Van (Marive!es Reef or
Terumbu Mantanani); (2) Da Kieu Ngua (Ardasier Reef or Terumbu Ub~; and (3) Da Hoa Lau (Swallow
Reef or Terumbu Layang). LASERNA,sII/Jra note 83.
the prolongation of its continental shelf and relies on Article 76 of the LOS
Convention to claim these Sprady Islands. Malaysia has established a
garrison on Layang Layang Island, the largest of the three islands it
occupies in 1983. It has also succeeded in developing SwallowReef into a
resort.
Brunei does not claim nor occupy any of the islands in the South
China Sea but claims Louisa Reef and Rifleman Bank, both located in the
southern portion of the Spradys as part of its continental shelf and
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) based on the principle of geographic
proximity and the relevant provisions of the LOS Convention. In 1984,
Brunei declared an EEZ that includes Louisa Reef, which is likewise
claimed by Malaysia.The two countries have been engagingin negotiations
since 1984 to resolve their competing claims.
B. An Evaluation of the Claims to Territorial Sovereignty
under International Law
The claim of China to the entire South China Sea which relies
heavily on historical records is merely proof of inchoate tide at best. While
it cannot be disputed that the Chinese had the earliest contact with the
islands of the South China Sea, China has not adduced evidence that it has
shows it exercised conclusive proof of effective, peaceful and continuous
occupation.94
Taiwan's claim, aside from being substantially similar to that of
China's, is also based upon the sllmehistorical evidence. 95Consequendy,it
suffers from the same weaknesses. However, Taiwan's continuous and
peaceful occupation of ltu Aba Island since 1956 constitutes an effective
exercise of sovereigntywhich may find basis in intemationallaw.96
94 See John W. Garver, China's PIISh through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and
National Interests, 132 THE CHINA Q. 999 (1992) which discusses the geo-strategic and economic
rationale for the aggressive military policy of China in the South China Sea. See aLro, Eric Hyer, The South
China Sea Disputes: Implications of China's Earlier Terntarial Settlements, 68 PAC. AFF. 34 (1995).
95 Kristen Nordhaug, Explaining Tai1lltln's Policies in the South China Sea, 1988-99,14 THE PAC. REv.
487 (2001).
% The ambiguity of Taiwan's status in intemationallaw severely weakens its bargaining position
and the absence of diplomatic relations, renders bilateral negotiations almost impossible.
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Vietnam's claim to the Spratly Islands suffers from the following
weaknesses: first, the historical basis of its claim is inconclusive; second, the
issue of succession to the French claim is tenuous; third, there are gaps in
the control of Vietnam over the Spratlys; and fourth, the statements made
by the former North Vietnamese government supporting the Chinese claim
substantiallyweakens Vietnam's current claim to the Spratlys.97
The claim of the Philippines hinges on the premise that the
islands were terra nullius or unclaimed and unoccupied at the time of their
discovery by Cloma. There seems to be two flaws to this claim: first, the
argument that the islands are terra nullius is tenuous and may not find
support in fact;98second, the argument that the Philippine government
succeeded from the claim of Cloma, a private person acting in an individual
capacity, is questionable. However, the fact that the Philippines has
exercised sovereignty and peacefully occupied eight of the islands in the
South China Sea since 1978 may prevail in international law.
The claim of Malaysia rests primarily on a misinterpretation of the
LOS Convention. The regime of the continental shelf under Article 76 of
the LOS Convention merely gives the coastal state the right to claim the
seabed resources appurtenant to it, but does not legally support a claim to
sovereignty over islands located in its continental shelf.99However, the
claim of Malaysia may still prevail under international law, albeit on a
different legal standard. The reason for this is Malaysia's peaceful and
continuous occupation of the islands it claims which are neither claimed
nor ever occupied by any other state claiming the Spratlys.
BruneiCsclaim to Louisa Reef, which is a submarine feature,lOOmay
prevail rightfully in international law on the basis of Article 76 of the LOS
Convention. However, Brunei must prove that the reef lies within the
97 Before the fall of Saigon in April 1975, North Vietnam had recognized and supported Chinese
sovereignty over the Nansha islands. However, after its reunification, it now declares that the Spratlys
have always belonged to Vietnam. Murphy, supra note 82 at 205.
98 Prior to Clorna's "discovery" of the Spratlys in 1947, it has been undoubtedly been discovered
and explored numerous times. Lan A. Mito, The Timor Gap TreafY as a Model for Joint Development in the
SpratIJ Islands, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 727, 743 (1998).
99 DONAT PHARAND & UMBERTO LEANZA, EDS., THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND THE
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: DEUMITATION AND LEGAL REGIME (1993).
100 Louisa Reef appears to be geologically a submarine feature, as opposed to an island. It is
essentially part of the seabed and has no permanent dry land nor is it habitable. Murphy, slljJra note 82 at
208.
extension of its continental shelf. On the other hand, Brunei's claim to
Rifleman Bank, which is likewise asserted on the basis of the extended
continental shelf principle, may not satisfy the LOS Convention
requirement since the East Palawan Trough separates Rifleman Bank from
Brunei and terminates the natural prolongation of its continental shelf.
The LOS Convention constitutes the primary legal framework in
addressing the conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea. The LOS
Convention is binding upon all claimant countries, with the exception of
Taiwan, all being parties to it. This fact need not be overstressed since all
the parties to the dispute invariably invoke the provisions of the LOS
Convention as a basis for their respective claims.
This part of the paper will discuss the inextricable link between the
legal framework of the LOS Convention and the South China Sea issue. In
order to establish this connection, this section aims to: first, discuss the
salient provisions of the LOS Convention relevant to the South China Sea
dispute; second, examine the options within the legal framework of the
LOS Convention with particular regard to its dispute settlement mechanism
provisions; and third, identify its limitations and issues in addressing the
South China Sea question.
The baseline is the line from which the seaward limits of a state's
maritime zones of jurisdiction are measured.IOI The measure of the breadth
of the territorial seal02and the seaward limits of the contiguous zone,103the
exclusive economic zone,l04 and the continental shelP 05are measured from
101 See especiallY. UNITED NATIONS. OFFICE FOR OCEAN AFFAIRSAND TIffi LAw OF TIlE SEA.,
BASELINES: AN EXAMINATION OF TIffi RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF TIffi UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON TIlE LAw OF TIffi SEA (1989).
102 Article 3, Los CONVENTION, which establishes that "every state has the right to establish the
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles."
103 Article 33(2), Los CONVENTION.
104 Article 57. Los CONVENTION. Articles 55 - 75 define the concept of an Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), which is an area up to 200 nautical miles beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea. The
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the same baseline. The territorial sea baseline may be of various types
depending on geographical configuration of the coastline.I06 The normal
baseline is the low-water line along the coast, including the coasts of islands,
as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.I07
The baseline for an island on an atoll or having fringing reefs is the seaward
low-water line on the reef.t08 Low-tide elevations, defined by the LOS
Convention as "a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and
above water at low tide but submerged at high tide," may only be used as a
baseline if they are wholly or partly within 12 nautical miles from the
mainland or an island.lo9
An island is defined in the LOS Convention as "a naturally formed
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide."11O
The LOS Convention qualifies that islandsll1 generate their own maritime
entitlements with the exception that "rocks that cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic
EEZ gives coastal states "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to" (above) "the
seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil ..." However, in exercising its rights and duties within the EEZ,
the coastal State is to have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and act in a manner
compatible with the Convention (Article 56(2».
105 Article 76, Los CONVENTION. Articles 76 defines the continental shelf of a nation, which
"comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or
to a distance of 200 nautical miles ...". This is important because Article 77 allows every nation to
exercise "over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its
natural resources".
106 Articles 7 and 47, Los CONVENTION (Straight and Archipelagic Baselines).
107 Articles 5 and 121(2), Los CONVENTION.
108 Article 6, Los CONVENTION.
tOO Article 13, Los CONVENTION. However, in certain instances low-tide elevations can be used
for establishing straight (archipelagic) baselines. See Article 7(4) and 47(4), Los CONVENTION.
110 Article 121 (1), Los CONVENTION. For academic literature on the legal regime of islands in
international law, see MARlus GJE1NES, THE LEGAL REGIME OF ISLANDSIN TIlE SOUTII CHINA SEA
(LLM Thesis, University of Oslo, 2(00); HtRAN W. JAYEWARDENE,THE REGIME OF ISLANDS IN
INTERNATIONALLAw, PUBUCATIONSON OCEAN DEVELOPMENT(1990) and D. W. BOWETT, THE
LEGALREGIME OF ISLANDSIN INTERNATIONALLAw (1979).
lit The word used in the Los CONVENTION is actually "rocks." The Los CONVENTION does not
define the term rock. It has been interpreted as a particular type of island in a geological sense and
within the context of Article 121, Los CONVENTION.
zone or a continental shelf'112 but still entitled to its own territorial sea and
a contiguous zone measured from that same baseline.1t3
The LOS Convention is explicit that artificial islands, installations,
and structures do not possess the status of islands, do not have a territorial
sea of their own, and do not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the
EEZ, or the continental shelf.lI4
The LOS Convention clearly sets out the limits of the various
maritime zones. The territorial sea can extend to 12 nautical miles from the
baselines determined in accordance with the Convention and the EEZ up
to 200 nautical miles from the same baselines.lI6 The continental shelf
extends up to 200 nautical miles from these baselines, or in certain
instances, to the outer edge of the continental margin.ll7 The criteria to
determine the outer limit of the continental shelf where it extends beyond
200 nautical miles is provided in Article 76 of the LOS Convention. liS
The above provisions of the LOS Convention form the underlying
layers upon which the core question of sovereignty or ownership over the
112 Article 121 (3), Los CONVENTION.
Itl Articles 3 and 33, Los CONVENTION. Please see, Barry Hart Dubner, The Spratfy 'Rocks' Dip,lIe-
-A 'Rockapela!,o' Defies Norms qflntemational UJw, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMPoL. J. 291 (1995).
114 Article 60(8) in relation with Article 11, Los CONVENTION. For the legal regime of artificial
islands in international law, see NIKOS PAPADAKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME OF
ARTIFICIALISLANDS(1977).
115 Jorge R. Coquia, Moritime Boundary Problems in the South China Sea, 24 BRIT. COLUM.L. REv. 117,
118 (1990) who opines that there will be actual overlapping EEZs and continental shelves if the
maritime zone measurements are drawn from archipelagic baselines.
116 Articles 3 and 57, Los CONVENTION.
117 The continental shelf can extend to 350 nautical miles from the baseline or 100 nautical miles
beyond the 2500 meter isobath. See Article 76 (5), Los CONVENTION.
118 Article 76 provides two rules for establishing the outer limit line and two restraint lines, beyond
which the continental shelf cannot extend in any case. Due to the dimensions of the South China Sea,
these restraint lines probably are of limited significance.5 1 The maximum extent of the continental shelf
is either a line defmed by fIXedpoints not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental
slope, or fixed points at each of which the sedimentary thickness is at least 1% of the shortest distance
from such point to the foot of the continental slope. Article 76(4), Los CONVENTION. See, PETER J.




disputed islands in the South China Sea should be viewed.119The provisions
are closely intertwined issues.l20 The normative guidelines in these
provisions provide essential guideposts for the kind of questions that need
to be preliminarily addressed. For example, which among the features in the
South China Sea is or is not an island?121This is vital to identify which
features can generate one or more zones of maritime jurisdiction.l22 But as a
prelude to that question, one must determine which of these features
support human habitation or economic life.123This is crucial in order to
indicate which features can claim an EEZ and a continental shelf.124The
point where all these maritime zones will be measured will depend on the
baseline. Thus, the baselines must be determined and which applicable
baseline will be used.125The other questions that the LOS Convention
provisions provide are more complex. This includes the identification of the
outer limits of the continental margin beyond 200 nautical miles.l26
It must be emphasized that the LOS Convention does not address
the issue of ownership or sovereignty to the South China Sea. In order to
answer this matter, one must refer to the intemationallegal rules pertaining
to the acquisition and loss of territory under intemationallaw which have
developed largely from state practice, customary international law and from
the interpretation of international judicial and arbitral tribunals.127
On another point, it must likewise be understood that the answers
to the above questions may not directly resolve the dispute in the South
119 See especia'!J, Alex G. Oude Elferink, The Island! in the South China Sea: How Does Their Pmence
Umit the Extmt of the High Seas and the Area and the Maritime Zones of the Mainland Coasts?, 32 OCEAN DEV.
& INT'L L. 169 (2001).
lW Marius Gjetnes, The Spmtlys: Are They Rocks or Island!?, 32 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 191 (2001).
121 Applying Article 121(1), LosCONVENTION. See literature that discuss this issue: Jonathan 1.
Charney, Rocks·that Cannot Sustain Human Habitation, 93 AM.J. INT'L L. 863 (1999); Barry Hart Dubner,
The Spmtly "Rocks" Dispute - A "Rockapelago" Defies Norms O/Intemational lAw' 9 TEMPLE INT'L & COMPo
L. J. 291 (1995); Marius Gjetnes, The Spmtlys: Are They Rocks or Island!? 32 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 191
(2001).
122 Those features which do not pass the test of Article 121(1) cannot generate zones of maritime
jurisdiction except a 500 meter safety zone.
\23 Article 121 (3), LosCONVENTION.
124 Id
125 Articles 5, 6, 7, and 47, LosCONVENTION.
\26 Article 76, LosCONVENTION.
127 Robin R Churchill, The Role of the International Court of Justice in Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in
OCEANS MANAGEMENTIN 1HE 21ST CENTURY:INSTITUTIONALFRAMEWORKSAND REsPONSES 125
(Alex G. Oude Elferink & D.R Rothwell, eds., 2(04); Barbara Kwiatkowska, The Eritrea·Yemen
Arbitmtion: lAndmark Progress in the Acquisition of Terntorial Sovereignty and Equitable Mariti",e Boundary
Delimitation, 32 OCEAN DEV. & INTI L. 1 (2001), Brian Taylor SUllUler, Terntorial Disputes at the
International Court of Justice, 53 DUKE L. J. 1779 (2003 . 2(04) .
China Sea. The reason for this is simple: the claimsmay still overlap. This is
not a remote possibility given the fact that a large portion of the South
China Sea is not located more than 200 nautical miles from the mainland
coasts and the area beyond 200 nautical miles from the mainland coasts is
within 200 nautical miles from the various islands throughout the South
China Sea.
The dispute settlement mechanism provided under the legal
framework of the LOS Convention establishes a compulsory and binding
framework for the pacific settlement of all ocean-related disputes.128 The
LOS Convention in Part XVl29 requires States Parties to settle any dispute
between them concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2 (3),130 of the
Charter of the United Nations and shall seek a solution by the means
indicated in Article 33 (1),131 of the Charter. 132
128 Please see excellent text outlining the history and development of the dispute procedures under
the Los CONVENTION in NATALIEKLEIN, DISPUTE SETILEMENTIN mE UN CONVENTION ON mE
LAw OF mE SEA (2005). See also, Edward Duncan Brown, Dipute Settlement alld the uw of the Sea: The
UN COllvelltioll &gime, 21 MARINE POL'y 17-43 (1997). See also A.O. Adede, Notes alld Comments, uwof
the Sea - The Illtegratioll of the System of Settlement ofDisputeJ ulllier the Draft COllvelltioll as a Whole, 72 AM. J.
INT'L L. 84 (1978). Compare with Louis B. Sohn, U.S. Policy Toward the Settlement ofuw of the Sea Disputes,
17 VA. J. INT'L L. 9 (1976-1977).
129 See article evaluating the dispute resolution provision in Part XV of the Los CONVENTION in
Rosemary Rayfuse, The Future of Compulsory Dipute Settlement ullder the UW of the Sea COllvelltioll, 36 VIe. U.
WELLINGTON L. REv. 683 (2005) and Andrew Serdy, The Paradoxical Success of UNCLOS Part XV: a
Half-hearted &pfy to Rayf'use, 36 VIe. U. WELLINGTONL. REv. 713 (2005).
130 Article 2(3), Chapter 1, UN Charter states: "All Members shall settle their international disputes
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered." Full text of the UN Charter online: < http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>.
131 The UN Charter lists the following means of peaceful setdement, which should be used by
member states in settling their disputes: "... negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, other peaceful means of their choice." Article
33, Chapter VI, UN Charter.
132 The United Nations framework is the principal global dispute settlement system in
contemporary international law. The Charter of the U.N. prohibits the use of force in settling
international disputes. It contains two parallel obligations: first, the obligation to settle international
disputes by peaceful' means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not
endangered; and second, to refrain "from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations." Articles 2(3) and Article 33(1), UN Charter. Please see Marine Dre!. The Dipute Settlement
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If a settlement has not been reached, the LOS Convention
stipulates that the dispute be submitted at the request of any party to the
dispute to a court or tribunal having jurisdiction in this regard. 133The LOS
Convention defInes those courts or tribunals as: (a) the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (e~tablished in accordahce with Annex VI
of the Convention) including the Seabed Disputes Chamber; (b) the
International Court of Justice; (c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in
accordance with Annex VII of the Convention; (d) a special arbitral tribunal
constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the
categories of disputes specifIed therein.134
The rules on delimitation laid down in the LOS Convention
proceeds from the premise of existing land boundaries.135In this sense, they
could not be invoked as a source of tide to territory. The LOS Convention
likewise does not address disputes over sovereignty.136 However, the
substantive or procedural rules of the LOS Convention provide the
guidelines by which a delimitation of maritime space can be carried out.
The LOS Convention contains provisions for the delimitation of
the territorial sea,137the EEZ138 and the continental shelf.139However, the
LOS Convention provisions do not clearly establish what substantive rules
of delimitation law have to be applied to delimit the EEZ and the
continental shelf.l40 The LOS Convention merely mentions that the
System in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Lalli of the Sea (LLM Thesis, Dalhousie Law School, 1992
) [unpublished] at 20 - 23. See also, JAMES S. SUTrERLAND, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
MAINTENANCEOF INTERNATIONALSECURI1Y:A CHALLENGET,o BE MET (1995).
133 Article 286, Los CONVENTION.
134 Article 287, Los CONVENTION. The availability of a variety of forums was a compromise to
secure consensus during the negotiations for the compulsory dispute settlement provisions of the Los
CONVENTION. Please see Jonathan Charney, The Implications of Expanding International Displlte Sellkment
Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Lalli the Sea, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 69, 71 (1996); Ted L. McDorman,
ClobalOcean Covemance and InternationalAdjlldicative Displlte Resoilition, 43 OCEAN & COASTALMGMT. 255
(2000).
m R HALLER TROST, THE SPRATLY ISLANDS: A STUDY ON THE LIMITATIONS OF
INTERNATIONALLAw 78 (1990).
136 See, Alex G. Dude Elferink. Does Undispllted Titk to a Maritime Zone AIJllt!Ys Excilide Its Delimitation:
The Crt)' Area Isslle (with Appendices of Slate Practice), 13 INT'LJ. MAR. & COAST.L. 143 (1998).
137 Article 15, Los CONVENTION.
138 Article 74, Los CONVENTION.
139 Article 83, Los CONVENTION
140 Please refer to Articles 74 (1) and 83 (1), Los CONVENTION.
delimitation is to be effected by agreement on the basis of, inter alia,
international agreements, customary international law and general principles
of law, to achieve an equitable solution.141 In addition, pending agreement
on the delimitation, States are urged to "make every effort to enter into
provisional arrangements of a practical nature"142
The LOS Convention proVisions on mant1ffie boundary
delimitation enunciate broad principles.143 This does not render it possible
to predict with accuracy the results when applied to a particular dispute.
However, the interpretation of these provisions in jurisprudence by the
International Court of Justice and other arbitral tribunals that dealt with
maritime delimitation has greatly enriched their application and contributed
to the development of customary internationallaw,144
The LOS Convention provides that when States have been unable
to reach agreement within "a reasonable time,"145 States are required to
submit to compulsory conciliation.l46 However, the optional exceptions to
the compulsory procedure in Article 298 show the clear intention to
remove maritime boundaries delimitation disputes from compulsory judicial
settlement. These elaborate mechanisms are designed to preserve the
sovereignty of States by giving the State parties the freedom to choose the
manner by which they will settle their differences.147
141 Article74(1),Los CONVENTION.
142 Article 74(3),Los CONVENTION.SUNPYo KIM,MARITIMEDEllMITATIONANDINTERIM
ARRANGEMENTSINNORlHEASTAsIA38- 60 (2004),NatalieKlein,Provisional Measures and Provisional
Arrangements in Maniime Boundary Disputes, 21 INT'LJ. MAR.& COASTALL. 423(2006).
143 See, CoalterLathrop, The Technical Asputs of International Maritime Boundary Delimitation, Depiction,
and Recovery, 28 OCEANDEV.& INT'LL. 167-197(1997);Bernard H. Oxman, International Maritime
Boundaries: Political, Strategic and Historical Considerations, 26U. MIAMINTER-AM.L. REv.243(1994-1995).
144 BarbaraKwiatkowska,EqJlitabk Maritime Boundary Delimitation, as Extmplified in the Work of the
International Courl of jJlStict During the Presidency of Sir Roberl Yewdal/ jennings and Beyond, 28OCEANDEV.&
INT'LL.91-145(1997).
145 Articles74(2)and 83(2),Los CONVENTION.
146 Article298(1)(a)(~,Los CONVENTION.The submissionto the compulsoryprocedures is not
automaticsinceStatesmaystillreservethe rightunderArticle298to havesuchdisputesexemptedfrom
the compulsoryforums.
147 See and compare, AnnexV, Article3;AnnexVI, Article4; AnnexVII, Article3;and AnnexVII,
Article3, Los CONVENTION.TullioTreves,C01!flicts Between the IntemationaiTribHnaifor the UJw oftbe Sea
and the International CoHrlofjustict" 31INT'LL.& POL.809(1999);A.O. Adede,Notes and Comments . .''Lzw
of the Sea: The Scope of the Tbird Parry, CompHlsory ProctdHresfor Settament of DiSPHtes, 71 AM.J. INT'L.L. 305
(1977).
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The dispute settlement mechanism within the framework of the
LOS Convention clearly creates an obligation among the claimant countries
to settle their conflicting claims peacefully.148 However, the principle of
peaceful settlement of international disputes operates on the basis of the
sovereign equality of states.149 The compulsory settlement mechanism
within the framework of the LOS Convention is triggered only as an option
where the parties are not able to settle their differences by peaceful means
of their choice. But, even then, the submission of a dispute to such a forum
depends on the willingness of the parties.150 This means that it is only as
good as the claimant states are willing to formally invoke it.151
On another level, even without going through the formal
compulsory procedure in any of the forums available, the claimant countries
using the other substantive provisions of the LOS Convention may define
their maritime zone claims in accordance with the rules established in the
LOS Convention. These may include the following: (1) specification of
their precise claims; (2) drawing and publishing the proper basepoints and
baselines along their coasts;152 and (3) negotiating to agree which features
are islands.
148 A. O. Adede, Prolegomena to the DispHteJ Settlement Part of the UlW of the Sea Convention, 10 N. Y. U.
J. INT'LL. & POL.253 (1977-1978);Howard Schiffmann,The DispHte Settlement MechaniJm of UNCLOS:
A Potentialfy Important ApparatHJ for Marine Wildlife Management 12 J. INT'LWILDLIFEL. & POL'y 293
(1998); Louis B. Sohn, SETTLEMENTOF DISPUTESARISINGOUT OF TIlE LAw OF TIlE SEA
CONVENTIO,12 SANDIEGOL. REv. 495 (1974-1975).
149 See, Ted L. McDorman, GlobalOctan Govemanct and International AdjHdicatit~ DispHte &.rolHtion, 43
OCEAN& COASTALMGMT255, 259 (2000).He asserts that dispute settlement procedure of the Los
CONVENTIONis not part of customary law and, thus, are only binding upon those states which are
parties to the Los CONVENTION.
ISO In this regard, the dispute resolutionmechanismmayappear to offer no progress over previous
regimes. This is actually not the case. In international law there is really no judicial forum with
compulsory jurisdiction.Any form of third party dispute resolution is founded upon the assent of the
parties involved. The lack of compulsion to submit to compulsory judicial forums under the Los
CONVENTIONis neither a serious drawbacknor does it fall short of legitimateexpectations. The Los
CONVENTIONdispute settlement regimeimprovesupon the Optional Protocol system.in the sense that
in the case of the former States become automaticallybound by the compulsory procedures upon
ratification of the LOS Convention; whereas under the latter States become bound only when they
become parties to the Protocol.
151 Barbara Kwiatkowska,The International COHrt of JHJtice and the UlW of the Sea: Some &JlectionJ, 11
INT'LJ. MAR.& COAST.L. 491 (1996).On the potential contribution and the limitations of the Los
CONVENTIONto resolve the South China Sea issue,please see,Xavier Furtado, International UlW and the
Di'PHte over the Spratfy IJ/and.r: Whither UNCLOS?, 21 CONTEMP.S.E. ASIA386 (1999).
152 This should be seen as a precondition for establishing a precise claim to 12 nautical-mile
territorial waters, a further 12 nm contiguous zone, a continental shelf and a 200 nm Exclusive
Economic Zone. See International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (pRIO). Maritime Conflict in Asia.
Energy and SeCHriryin the SOHth China Sea, Main Findings(Finding10)online:<http://www.prio.no/page
/Project _detail/ /9244/42207.html>.
While all the claimant countries invoke the provisions of the LOS
Convention in support of their respective claims and even in assailing the
claim of others, the compulsory dispute resolution mechanism provided
within the LOS Convention is not seen as a viable option in addressing the
South China Sea issue.153There are several possible reasons for this view:
first, the realization of the parties that their respective territorial claims do
not fInd solid basis in law and not unassailable;154second, the notion of a
court adjudicated settlement connotes victors and losers which is Asians are
culturally averse;155third, the logistical and fInancial expense of bringing a
case to an international tribunal is staggering which some of the claimant
states can ill afford;156and fourth, there exists substantial divergences in
interpretation of vital LOS Convention provisions among the parties.15?
m For a discussion of the issue of the South China Sea from a regional perspective, see DOUGLAS
M. JOHNSTON AND MARK J. VALENCIA, PACIFIC BOUNDARYPROBLEMS:STATUSAND SOLUTIONS
(1991); JAMESCRAWFORDAND DONALD R. R01HWELL. THE LAw OF mE SEAIN mE ASIANPACIFIC
REGION (1995).
IS< Jane E. Ellis, International UlW and OilY Waters: A Critical AnalYsis, 6 Cow. J. INT'L EN\'TL. L. &
POL'y 31 (1995). But see Zou Keyuan, Historic Rights in International UlW and in Gina's Pnu:tice, 32
OCEAN DEV. & INT'LL. 160 (2001).
155 Ian Townsend-Gault, Compliance with the United Nations Convtnlion on the UlW 0/ the Sea in the Asia-
Pacific Region, 33 U. BRIT. COLUM.L. REv. 227 (1999-2000).
'56 Jonathan I. Charney, The Implications 0/ E>..panding International Displlte Selliement Sy,rtem.r: The 1982
Convtntion on the UlW 0/ the Sea, 90 AM.J. INT'L. L. 69 (1996).
IS7 For example, on the interpretation and application of the provision of the Los CONVEN'nON
on baselines. The Los CONVENTION only allows the utilization of straight baselines in cases where
Article 7 is applicable. The Philippines and Indonesia as 'archipelagic' states, have the right to use
archipelagic baselines running between basepoints on the outermost islands. Although the Philippines
has,primafl1l.ie, done so in accordance with the rules established in Los CONVENTION, it has not made
clear that it is using the principle of archipelagic baselines. It has also refrained from fulfilling its duty to
designate international sea-lanes through its archipelagic waters. Malaysia has published a precise claim
to a continental shelf and EEZ but has not published any baselines. Vietnam, China and Taiwan have all
made illegitimate use of straight baselines. The 1982 baseline legislation of Vietnam's, published just
before Los CONVENTION was signed, is one of the most radical in the world. The PRC's illegitimate
system of unique straight baselines, which it published in 1996 even drew a line around the Paracels
treating them as they were an archipelagic state. The ROC (faiwan) published a similarly illegitimate
system of baselines in 1999. These illegitimate baselines impede rather than facilitate the resolution of
disputes. The claimant states must realize that they neither enhance national interests. Maritime zones
based on illegitimate baselines will not be respected by other seafaring states and will not be considered
valid in conflicts involving other states. They will likewise be considered unacceptable by the opposite
party in negotiations concerning median lines. HALLER-TROST,,rllfJm note 135 at 63.
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A. Sustaining Mechanisms for Multilateral Negotiations in
Good Faith
The resolution of the South China Sea issue will largely depend
upon the extent the parties are willing to cooperate with one another.158 If
all the parties are truly desirous of a pacific solution to this imbroglio, then,
the mechanisms for continued multilateral dialogue conducted in good faith
and in the spirit of genuine cooperation must be sustained.159 In addition,
previously existing bilateral and trilateral initiatives must be continued.l60
The promising initiatives made recently under the aegis of the
ASEAN must be maintained.161 On a substantive level, the agenda on the
negotiating table must be dramatically expanded. The parties must be
willing to agree to negotiate, and hopefully arrive at mutually acceptable
positions, with respect to issues other than the resolution of the sovereignty
question.162 The negotiations agenda must transcend traditional confidence
building measures and shift towards regional concerns upon which
consensus can be established.163 The following areas will be worthy of
inclusion: piracy and armed robbery at sea;164maritime terrorism; drug
trafficking; human smuggling; combating transnational crime; illegal fishing;
158 Louis B. Sohn, Sellkment of1JJwofthe Sea Disputes, 10 INT'LJ. MAR. & COAST. L. 205 (1995).
159 See LEE LAI To, CHINA AND TIlE SOUTH SEA DIALOGUES (1999) which confirms China's
well-understood emphasis on discussing the issues bilaterally with the various claimants (which gives
Chinese an undue advantage based on its size and power), and demonstrates that Beijing did not rule out
the possibility of multilateral discussions, and has even come (albeit somewhat grudgingly) to accept
these as long as they are held in the context of ASEAN.
160 China, in particular, has engaged most claimant countries on a bilateral basis to discuss its claim
and/ or to reduce tensions. China has had successful bilateral rliscussions with Malaysia, Vietnam, and
the Philippines. Malaysia and Vietnam have also intensified their bilateral discussions and have even
entered into joint development agreements over disputed areas in the Gulf of Thailand. See, Peter Kien-
Hong Yu, Selling Up International (Adversary) Regime.r in the South China Sea: Anafyr;jng the Db.rtades from a
Chinese Per.rpecti/~,38 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 151 (2007).
161 Nikias Swanstrom, Conflict Management and Negotiations in the South China Sea: The ASEAN Way?,
online: <http://www.sum.uio.no/southchinasea/Publications/pdf-format/ Swanstrom. pd£'>.
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safety of navigation and communication at sea; search and rescue operation;
marine environmental protection; and marine scientific research.165
The creation of an authority that will jointly manage166 the
resources of the South China Sea is not a novel idea.167In fact, there are
numerous scholars who have put forth a range of options for consideration
as part of a multilateral joint resource development authority.168 The legal
norm of joint development in disputed areas pending the settlement of a
disputed maritime boundary is likewise provided in the LOSC
Convention.169 There are also existing international arrangements in other
parts of the world from which this proposed body can be patterned after.170
It must be emphasized though that the creation of a multilateral
authority which will manage the resources of the South China Sea should be
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seen as an interim measure.!?! The eventual resolution of the issue of
ownership over the disputed islands must still be addressed.
The imperative to capacitate the claimant states definitely go
beyond the issue of the South China Sea. The disputant states are all in
varying stages of economic development. It is not a surprise that they all
turn their direction towards the South China Sea for the potential economic
benefits they may reap from its touted hydrocarbon reserves. However, as
long as the issue of sovereignty over the South China Sea is unresolved,
there are no winners to the game.
The potential solution within the LOS Convention framework is
neither easy nor inexpensive. The checklist of things that can be done
within this framework is long. For example, the determination of
basepoints and the drawing of baselines and its publication; the
identification of which features can qualify as islands; the identification of
the outer limits of the continental margin exceeding 200 nautical miles;
among others. To carry out these activities necessitates the pooling of huge
resources on the part of these cash-strapped economies. In addition, the
costs of externalities to the dispute are likewise as staggering. For example,
the costs for maintaining garrisons, military installations and other types of
physical presence in the islands; the expense of border patrol and maritime
enforcement; the impact of rising defense budget allocation to preserve and
assert their respective claims. These do not even include the damage to the
environment due to illegal and unregulated fishing, and marine pollution.
The scramble over the flyspecks of land masses that jut out of the
South China Sea figuratively go deep below the surface. It has been reduced
by many analysts as simply a resource war over oil.172 The analysis is sound
albeit much simplified. The claimant countries are all developing nations,
with the possible exception of Taiwan, with a desperate need to broaden
their resource base. In fact, the territorial dispute over the South China Sea
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only gained prominence when oil and natural gas was discovered off the
coast of the Philippines in the 1970s. The potential hydrocarbon resources
of the South China Sea have only added fuel to the already fiery sense of
nationalistic fervor of the disputant countries.
Capacity building not only entails the mobilization of resources in
order to enable the parties to carry out the above outlined activities within
the LOS Convention framework. It may be as simple as ensuring that the
parties are aware of the options availableto them under international law to
settle this dispute.
The legal framework of the LOS Convention constitutes the
paradigmatic "box" referred to in this paper. At the center of this box is the
question of who owns the islands of the South China Sea.The reduction of
the complex issue of the South China Sea into this legal formulation
anchored on the question of sovereigntyhas only resulted in a longstanding
impasse.173It has also obscured other issues, equally relevant that need to
be addressed such as regional security174and the marine environment.175
This paper does not suggest nor imply that the legal framework of
the LOS Convention should be abandoned or has lost its relevance in
addressing the issue of the South China Sea. The challenge posed by this
paper was to think outside of this box. Outside of the box is still another
box - albeit a bigger one. The bigger box does not discard the LOS
Convention, but builds upon it.
Towards this end, this paper first explained the complex nature of
the South China Sea issue. In the second part, it discussed the bases of the
conflicting claims and provided a brief evaluation of their relative strengths
and weaknesses as well as their validityunder international law. In the third
part, it outlined and examined the relevant provisions of the LOS
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Convention and identified their promises as well as their shortcomings in
addressing the South China Sea issue. In the last part, possible solutions
were explored toward the pacific settlement of the issue primarily within the
legal framework of the LOS Convention and outside of it.
In conclusion, there are three main points that this paper has
emphasized: first, that the conflicting claims of sovereignty over the South
China Sea is indeed a complex issue in international law; second, that the
legal framework within the LOS Convention provides guideposts in
addressing the dispute but is not the only solution to this issue; and last,
that the resolution of the South China Sea issue lies upon the willingness of
the parties to continue negotiations in good faith in order to find a solution
that is mutually acceptable to all the claimant states.
